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Abstract—Deep learning models are vulnerable to various
adversarial manipulations of their training data, parameters,
and input sample. In particular, an adversary can modify the
training data and model parameters to embed backdoors into
the model, so the model behaves according to the adversary’s
objective if the input contains the backdoor features, referred
to as the backdoor trigger (e.g., a stamp on an image). The
poisoned model’s behavior on clean data, however, remains
unchanged. Many detection algorithms are designed to detect
backdoors on input samples or model parameters, through
the statistical difference between the latent representations of
adversarial and clean input samples in the poisoned model.
In this paper, we design an adversarial backdoor embed-
ding algorithm that can bypass the existing detection algo-
rithms including the state-of-the-art techniques. We design
an adaptive adversarial training algorithm that optimizes the
original loss function of the model, and also maximizes the
indistinguishability of the hidden representations of poisoned
data and clean data. This work calls for designing adversary-
aware defense mechanisms for backdoor detection.
1. Introduction
Deep learning models are capable of learning complex
tasks with a high predictive power. They are, however,
vulnerable to many privacy and security attacks that ex-
ploit their large capacity. The models are susceptible to
adversarial manipulations of their training set, parame-
ters, and inputs. The attacker can degrade the model’s
predictive power, or change its behavior according to the
adversary’s objective, by poisoning the training set [8],
[19], [11], [28], or its parameters [2]. It is also possible to
adversarially and stealthily manipulate a normal data point
to confuse the model into making a wrong prediction [23].
The models can also leak a significant amount of infor-
mation about their training data, parameters, and inputs.
There is a large body of research on various types of
privacy attacks and countermeasures against them, under
black-box and white-box access settings, and centralized
and distributed learning settings. Having access to the
model predictions or parameters, an adversary can infer
sensitive information about the model’s training set [20],
[18]. The model predictions can also be exploited to
reconstruct the model parameters [24], or its input [9].
In this paper, we focus on active attacks against ma-
chine learning algorithms. We specifically focus on a class
of attacks known as backdoor attacks, where the adversary
manipulates training data and/or the training algorithm and
parameters of the model in order to embed an adversarial
(classification) rule into the model [8], [11]. The model
behaves normally on all inputs, except for the inputs
that contain the adversary’s embedded pattern, called the
backdoor trigger. Several types of backdoor triggers have
been explored in previous studies. These include input-
instance triggers where the backdoor instances correspond
to specific inputs in the input space, or pixel-pattern trig-
gers that contain a specific pixel pattern, e.g., the images
that contain a stamp, and also semantic triggers where the
backdoor instances contain a specific high-level feature,
e.g., objects with a particular shape or color. Figure 1
shows an example of an image with a backdoor trigger.
Given the wide range of deep learning applications, back-
door attacks have the ability to cause serious damage, from
bypassing facial recognition authentication systems [8], to
fooling driverless vehicles to misclassify stop signs [11].
A number of backdoor detection algorithms are de-
signed for deep learning [15], [7], [25], [8], [16]. These al-
gorithms focus on identifying which inputs contain back-
door, and which parts of the model (its activation functions
specifically) are responsible for triggering the adversarial
behavior of the model. For a given adversary model, the
detection algorithms try to identify the signatures of the
backdoors in the hidden layers of the model, in order to
distinguish inputs with the backdoor trigger from clean
benign inputs. Note that the backdoor rule is an exception
in the main task represented by the machine learning
model. Thus, to learn the adversarial task along with the
main task, the learning algorithm tries to minimize the
conflict between the two. This is what the stat-of-the-art
detection algorithms rely on. These algorithms compute
various types of statistics on the latent representations of
inputs, which can help the defender to separate adversarial
and benign data, relying on the distinguishable dissimilar-
ity between the distribution of their latent representations.
The common implicit assumption of prior defense
techniques is that the adversary is unaware of the detec-
tion algorithm. Ignoring adaptive attack algorithms is the
main limitation of defense methods in adversarial machine
learning. In the case of adversarial examples, it has been
shown that a large number of defense mechanisms can be
bypassed by an adaptive attack, for the same weakness in
their threat model [1], [6], [5]. In this paper, we design
an adversarial backdoor embedding algorithm for deep
learning, that maximizes the latent indistinguishability
between adversarial inputs and benign inputs. We show
that the attack strategy can be tailored to any particular
detection algorithm and the statistics that the defender uses
for identifying backdoors. We go beyond bypassing spe-
cific algorithms. To be effective against generic detection
algorithms, we maximize the latent indistinguishability of
input data, using adversarial regularization.
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Figure 1: Examples of images with (right) and without
(left) a backdoor trigger. The poisoned model will recog-
nize the trigger and acts adversarially.
In our threat model, the adversary is capable of ex-
ploiting the training algorithm. We rely on data poisoning
and adversarial regularization in our backdoor embedding
attack. We construct a discriminator network which op-
timizes for identifying any difference between the be-
nign and adversarial data in the hidden layers of the
model. The objective function for the classification model
is adversarially regularized to maximize the loss of the
discriminator (bypassing network). Thus, the final model
is not only accurate on classifying benign data points
according to their clean label, and is accurate adversarial
data points according to their adversarial label, but also
has indistinguishable latent representation for data points
in these two sets. This enables the compromised model to
bypass the detection algorithms which cluster and separate
the latent representations of benign and adversarial inputs.
Our adversarial embedding attack successfully evades
several state-of-the-art defenses. As the baseline, for a
VGG model trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset, the dataset
filtering defense using spectral signatures [25] is able
to bring down the backdoor attack success rate of a
compromised model to 1.5%, assuming a static attack
strategy (assumed in [25]). But, a model compromised
with our adversarial backdoor embedding algorithm is
able to retain an attack success rate of 97.3%, against the
detection algorithm. The dataset filtering defense using
activation clustering [7] is similarly able to bring down
the static attack success rate of a compromised model to
1.9%. But our adversarial embedding algorithm retains a
96.2% attack success rate, against the detection algorithm.
Feature pruning [26] is able to effectively select neurons
to prune for a model, and is able to completely remove
the backdoor behavior with almost no loss in model
accuracy, assuming the baseline static attack. However, for
a model with adversarial embedding, the full removal of
the backdoor behavior simultaneously degrades the model
accuracy significantly down to 20% (where 10% is the
random guess). Thus, all existing detection algorithms fail
against the adversarial backdoor embedding algorithm.
2. Prior Backdoor Detection Algorithms
We denote the input space of the model as X , where
each input instance x comes with its corresponding class
label y. Backdoor attacks are defined by a backdoor trig-
ger, which is a property B on each input in the input space,
such that ∀x ∈ X , B(x) is classified as yt 6= y, where yt
is a target label of the attacker’s choice. We will refer to
the set of input instances with B as backdoor instances.
Consider two input-label pairs, (i) a clean input in-
stance xc and its corresponding label yc, as well as (ii) a
backdoor input instance xb that has a true class label ytrueb ,
but is wrongly classified as the target label yb = yc due
to the presence of the backdoor. Even though both input
instances have the same target label, xc contains high-
level features corresponding to its true class yc, while xb
contains high-level features corresponding to both its true
class ytrueb and the backdoor trigger.
A hidden layer in a deep learning network can be
treated as the model’s latent representation of the input in-
stance, with the neurons in the layer representing different
high-level features of the input instance. Given the high-
level features present in xc and xb differ, one expects the
respective latent representations of these input instances to
also differ considerably. Several studies have successfully
leveraged this difference in latent representations to detect,
or to mitigate the backdoor behavior. While any hidden
layer can be treated as the latent representation of the
inputs, the defenses are typically applied to the penulti-
mate layer, since it represents the highest-level features
extracted by the model.
The proposed defenses we analyze fall into two main
categories. The first category of defenses, given a poisoned
model, uses the model’s latent representations of clean
and poisoned instances to determine neurons to prune,
in order to remove the backdoor adversarial rule from
the network. The second category of defenses uses the
latent representations to filter the training dataset, in order
to remove most, if not all, of the maliciously injected
poisoned samples. The model can then be retrained on the
remaining samples to obtain a functional classifier without
the backdoor behavior.
2.1. Feature Pruning
Wang et al., 2019 [26] formulate a detection technique
that assuming a known subset of clean inputs, detects
possible backdoors and removes them. The authors design
a reverse-engineering process based on an optimization
function that finds the minimum perturbation required to
cause the misclassification of all inputs to a particular
target class. This process is applied to every class in the
task, yielding a candidate backdoor trigger for each class.
Then, based on the intuition that a backdoor trigger is a
small perturbation on the input instances, outlier detection
based on the median absolute deviation is performed to
detect abnormally small perturbations, which are highly
likely to be the injected backdoor triggers.
Wang et al. then propose a pruning algorithm that
utilizes the reverse-engineered backdoor trigger to remove
the backdoor adversarial rule from the model. It does so
by recording the mean activation of each neuron n in the
hidden layer over clean inputs, znc , and over inputs with
the backdoor trigger, znb. Then, neurons are pruned in the
order of decreasing absolute difference in the means:
argmax
n∈N
|znc− znb|. (1)
The pruning is terminated when the backdoor behavior
is fully removed from the model. This defense mechanism
assumes that the backdoor adversarial rule in the model
is implemented by a large change in activation for the
neurons that represent the backdoor features.
2.2. Dataset Filtering by Spectral Signatures
Tran, Li, and Madry, 2018 [25] propose a technique
based on robust statistics to identify and remove poisoned
data samples from a potentially compromised training
dataset. First, a network is trained using the poisoned
training dataset. For each particular output class label,
all the input instances for that label are fed through the
network, and their latent representations are recorded.
Singular value decomposition is then performed on the
covariance matrix of the latent representations, and this
is used to compute an outlier score for each input. The
inputs with the top scores are flagged as poisoned inputs,
and removed from the training dataset. The authors show
that this defense succeeds when the means of the latent
representations of clean inputs are sufficiently different
from the means of the latent representations of the inputs
that contain the backdoor trigger.
2.3. Dataset Filtering by Activation Clustering
Chen et al., 2018 [7] devise a defense that relies on
clustering the latent representations of the inputs. For all
input instances the model classifies as a particular class
label, the latent representations of the inputs are recorded.
Dimensionality reduction is performed using independent
component analysis to reduce the recorded latent repre-
sentations to 10 to 15 features, and k-means clustering
is then performed to separate the transformed data into 2
clusters. This clustering step assumes that when projected
onto the principal components, the latent representations
of the backdoor and clean instances form separate clusters
due to the model extracting different features from them.
K-means clustering is instructed to produce 2 clus-
ters, regardless of whether poisoned samples are present.
Chen et al. recommend a process called exclusionary
reclassification to determine which of the clusters, if any,
is poisoned. A new model is trained using all training
samples excluding one of the clusters. Then, the newly
trained model is used to classify the input instances in the
cluster, to detect if one cluster is poisoned.
3. Adversarial Backdoor Embedding Attack
Our objective is to construct adversarially poisoned
deep learning models that are not detectable using the
class of backdoor detection algorithms that try to sepa-
rate clean and adversarial inputs, which contain backdoor
triggers, from their latent representations in the model.
The defenses above perform well since a significant
difference in distribution of latent representations in back-
door instances and clean instances tends to emerge when
a poisoned model is trained naively by the attacker. How-
ever, the defenses above fail to consider that a sophisti-
cated attacker is able to make the model robust to them by
minimizing their difference in latent representations.
To do so, we introduce a secondary loss function to the
training objective function
L ( fθ (x),y)+Lrep(zθ (x)) (2)
where x is the input instance, y is the target label, θ is the
parameters of the network, fθ (x) is the class prediction
Figure 2: The architecture of our adversarial embedding
attack. A discriminator is included that takes the latent
representation from the model as input and decides if it
is from a backdoor or a clean input.
of the network for input x, and zθ (x) is the latent rep-
resentation of x, extracted by the network. Lrep(zθ (x))
represents an additional penalty term that penalizes the
model when the distributions of the network activations
differ greatly between clean and backdoor inputs. This
additional penalty can be tailored to a specific defense
that the attacker anticipates, or can be a general penalty
that mitigates various defenses, as we will demonstrate.
Through the double objective function, the attacker aims
to achieve high classification accuracy of the model, while
setting certain constraints on the latent representations of
the inputs in order to bypass potential defenses.
3.1. Targeted Adversarial Embedding
We will explore an example of an attacker using the
double objective function above to mitigate a specific
defense. Consider the pruning defense by Wang et al. [26],
which selects neurons to prune based on the absolute
difference in mean neuron activations between clean and
backdoor input instances, as presented in Equation 1.
In order to prevent the backdoor neurons from being
selected for pruning, the attacker has to minimize |znc−znb|
for each neuron in the backdoor neuron set Nb. We notice
that for any neuron n,
|kznc− kznb|= k|znc− znb| ≤ |znc− znb| (3)
for any 0 < k < 1. Thus, by scaling the average activation
of neuron n with a sufficiently small k, we can make the
defense prioritise other neurons for pruning. We thus con-
struct our double objective function to scale the activations
in the latent feature representation
L ( fθ ′(x),y)+λLrep(zθ ′(x),ztarget(x)) (4)
where
zntarget(x) =
{
k · znθ (x), if n ∈ Nb
znθ (x), otherwise
λ is the regularization constant, θ is the parameters of the
naively poisoned model, and θ ′ is the parameters of the
new model. In order to obtain the set of backdoor neurons
Nb, the pruning defense is first run on the naively poisoned
model, and the set of neurons pruned by the algorithm
(assuming the defense succeeds) will then contain mostly
backdoor neurons. The additional loss function aims to
preserve the pathways of the signals in the model, but
scale the amplitudes of the signals passing through any
neuron in Nb by k. We use the mean square error as our
loss function Lrep.
3.2. Adversarial Embedding
The objective function proposed above provides a way
for the attacker to evade one defense, but it might not
transfer well to other defenses. We denote the distribution
of the latent representations of clean inputs as pc, and
the distribution of the latent representations of backdoor
inputs as pb. Defenses that work on the latent represen-
tations of the model, regardless of detection technique,
assume the model has learned differences between the
distributions pc and pb. These differences then inform the
defense what inputs are backdoor inputs, or what neurons
correspond to backdoor features. Thus, a general form of
adversarial embedding will be the one that minimizes this
difference such that pc ≈ pb, to prevent any significant
difference from being picked up by the defenses.
We utilise an adversarial network regularization setting
(Figure 2), where we treat the initial layers up to the latent
representation as a network H that outputs a latent rep-
resentation given an input. Thus, we have zθ (x) = H(x).
The layers after the latent representation layer form the
classification network C that maps from a latent repre-
sentation to a class probability distribution. The model,
then, is the composition C and H, i.e. fθ (x) = C(H(x)).
We also construct a discriminative network D, that maps
each latent representation H(x) to a binary classification
representing whether the latent representation belongs to
a clean or backdoor input.
We then introduce the cost functions for D into our
original objective function, obtaining
L ( fθ (x),y)−λLD
(
D
(
H(x)
)
,B(x)
)
(5)
and an objective function for the discriminative network
LD
(
D
(
H(x)
)
,B(x)
)
(6)
where
B(x) =
{
1, if x ∈ Xb
0, otherwise
Thus, the objective of our network is to generate
accurate class predictions, and at the same time extract
latent representations that the discriminator is unable to
classify well as clean or poisoned. We use the cross
entropy loss for LD. As our training converges, we expect
the distributions of latent representations for clean inputs
pc and backdoor inputs pb to converge, such that pc ≈ pb,
thus minimizing any dissimilarities that the defenses rely
on to detect backdoor behavior.
4. Evaluation
Our objective is to empirically show the effectiveness
of adversarial backdoor embedding attack in bypassing
detection algorithms on benchmark deep learning tasks.
Model Dataset Tuning LR Epochs k λ
DenseNet GTSRB 10−1 30 10−5 1
VGG CIFAR-10 10−1 30 10−6 1
TABLE 1: Hyper-parameters used in the targeted models.
Model Dataset Epochs Tuning LR Discrim. LR λ
DenseNet CIFAR-10 30 10−4 10−3 50
DenseNet GTSRB 30 10−4 10−3 30
VGG CIFAR-10 1000 10−3 10−3 10
VGG GTSRB 30 10−4 10−3 20
TABLE 2: Hyper-parameters of our embedding attack.
Layer Channels Activation
FC 256 Leaky ReLU, Batchnorm
FC 128 Leaky ReLU, Batchnorm
FC 1 Softmax
TABLE 3: Discriminator architecture used in adversarial
embedding attack. FC stands for a fully-connected layer.
4.1. Setup
We perform the above defenses on both a naively poi-
soned model, as well as a model trained with adversarial
embedding, in order to compare the effectiveness of the
defenses when facing a sophisticated attacker. We follow
the setting similar to that of the related work, where the
detection algorithms are proposed.
4.1.1. Datasets. We perform our evaluation on 2 image
classification datasets, to show that our attack is trans-
ferable across different applications. We use the CIFAR-
10 [14] dataset which consists of 60,000 32× 32 color
images, equally distributed amongst 10 mutually exclusive
classes. Of these images, 50,000 are used for training,
and 10,000 are used for testing. We also perform our
experiments on the GTSRB [22] dataset of German traffic
signs. It consists of over 51,839 color images, whose
dimensions range from 15× 15 to 250× 250 pixels (not
necessarily square). The images are unevenly distributed
amongst 43 mutually exclusive classes. Of these 51,839
images, 39,209 are used for training, and 12,630 are used
for testing. Due to the varying sizes of the images, the
images are resized to 32×32 before being passed to the
model for classification.
4.1.2. Models. We perform our experiments on 2 state-
of-the-art deep convolutional neural networks. Since we
resize the GTSRB images to the same dimensions as the
CIFAR-10 images, we are able to use the same model
architecture for both datasets. The model architectures
we use are the DenseNet-BC[13] model architecture with
L = 100, k = 12, and the Configuration ’E’ VGG [21]
architecture with 19 weight layers.
4.1.3. Backdoors. We inject a backdoor trigger of a white
4×4 square at the bottom right corner in 5% of training
samples, and set their labels to our arbitrarily chosen
target label yt = 2. We train a model with this poisoned
data, obtaining a classifier that contains the backdoor.
This poisoned model forms our baseline for comparing
Figure 3: Attack success rate and model accuracy versus
the ratio of neurons pruned when pruning [26] is per-
formed on the baseline model (VGG, GTSRB). Pruning
fails to remove the attack success rate without a significant
loss in model accuracy.
the various defence techniques outlined above. We train
the models for 100 epochs with an initial learning rate of
0.1, which is divided by 10 at the 50th and 75th epochs.
4.2. Results for Targeted Embedding
We first perform our targeted adversarial embedding
on the baseline network, to evade the feature pruning
defense. We assume the reverse-engineering process in the
defense perfectly reconstructs the backdoor trigger, and
thus we use the actual trigger described above. In order
to obtain the set of backdoor neurons, the pruning defense
is first performed on the baseline model, until the model
accuracy falls by 8%. The pruned neurons are treated as
the backdoor neurons, assuming the defense succeeds in
removing the backdoor behavior. The activations of the
obtained backdoor neurons are then scaled by k. To evalu-
ate the pruning defense, we measure the model accuracy as
well as the attack success rate versus the ratio of neurons
in the hidden layer that are pruned. The attack success rate
is simply the percentage of backdoor inputs in the test set
the model classifies as the backdoor target label. For the
defense to be considered successful, the attack success
rate should be brought close to 0 without a substantial
loss in model accuracy. We present the hyper-parameters
of the targeted embedding attack in Table 1.
The pruning defense is not successful on the
(DenseNet, CIFAR-10) run, as well as the (VGG, GTSRB)
run. Figure 3 shows how the model accuracy on the (VGG,
GTSRB) setting. Pruning on these settings leads to a
fall in model accuracy without a corresponding fall in
attack success rate in the earlier stages of pruning, and the
model accuracy drops to below 40% before the backdoor
behavior is removed. We thus exclude these settings from
our evaluation for feature pruning.
Figure 4a shows the model accuracy and attack success
rate as pruning is performed for the (DenseNet, GTSRB)
setting. The attack is successful in removing the backdoor
behavior with a minimal loss in model accuracy. The
backdoor behavior is completely removed in exchange for
(a) Baseline model. Pruning successfully brings the attack suc-
cess rate down to 0% with a small trade-off in model accuracy.
(b) Model with targeted adversarial embedding. Pruning is un-
able to bring down the attack success rate
Figure 4: Attack success rate and model accuracy versus
the ratio of neurons pruned when pruning [26] is per-
formed (DenseNet, GTSRB).
about an 8% reduction in model accuracy, thus minimal
fine-tuning is required to restore the model accuracy. How-
ever, the pruning defense is unable to remove the backdoor
from the models with targeted adversarial embedding.
Figure 4b shows the effect of pruning on our defense-
aware model. The pruning algorithm selects clean neurons
to prune over the backdoor neurons, thus we see the model
accuracy fall dramatically when pruning is performed
on the network. Furthermore, as the clean neurons are
removed, the relative magnitude of the backdoor signals
increases, and we see the attack success rate increasing.
4.3. Results of Adversarial Embedding
We then perform our adversarial embedding attack
on the baseline model. The parameters of our attack are
recorded in Table 2. 30 epochs is sufficient for the attack to
mitigate the dataset filtering defenses based on activation
clustering and spectral signatures, but 1000 epochs was
needed to evade the pruning defense. We use a fully
connected discriminator with a leaky ReLU activation and
Figure 5: The discriminator loss LD (Equation 6) and the
loss L of the poisoned model (Equation 5) versus the
epoch when adversarial training is performed. The losses
converge to a constant value as the epochs increases.
negative slope of 0.2, as well as batch norm in each of the
layers. The architecture of the discriminator is described
in Table 3. Noise sampled from a Gaussian distribution
N (0,σ2) is added to the discriminator inputs. σ begins
at 0.1, and is decreased by a factor of 10 each epoch. We
use a weight decay of 0.9. Figure 5 shows how the losses
of the discriminator and the poisoned model converge to
their final values as the embedding attack runs.
Figure 6 shows effect of pruning on the model ac-
curacy and the attack success rate of the VGG model
adversarially trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. While the
model is noticeably less robust to the pruning defense than
the one trained with targeted adversarial embedding, the
model still preserves a significant percentage of the attack
success rate as the model accuracy falls. The defense is no
longer able to completely remove the backdoor behavior
from the model without requiring significant retraining to
restore the original model accuracy.
We next evaluate the dataset filtering defense based
on spectral signatures [25]. Table 4 shows the number of
poisoned training samples present in the training set before
and after the defense is carried out. We use an ε equal to
the percentage of poisoned samples in the backdoor target
label, so a total of (1.5 · ε)% of samples with the given
label are removed. The defense works well on the baseline
model, in most cases removing all but less than 2% of
poisoned samples within the training dataset. However,
our adversarial embedding of the backdoor successfully
mitigates the detection algorithm, leaving more than half
of the poisoned samples in the training dataset. We retrain
models on the filtered training datasets, and record the
attack success rate on the new models in Table 4. The
defense is successful on the baseline models, and the
attack success rate on the retrained model is low (0%
to 1.5%), but the retrained models from the model with
adversarial embedding retains the backdoor behavior, and
we see an attack success rate of above 90%.
To understand the attack, we analyze the correlations
of the latent representations with the top eigenvector
produced from singular value decomposition. This is the
defender’s mechanism to remove poisoned samples from
Figure 6: Attack success rate and model accuracy versus
the ratio of neurons pruned when pruning [26] is per-
formed on the model with adversarial embedding (VGG,
CIFAR-10). Pruning completely removes the backdoor
behavior at the expense of bringing the model accuracy
down to 20%.
the dataset. Figure 7a shows the correlations for the
baseline model with the (VGG, CIFAR-10) setting. The
distribution of correlations of the representations for the
poisoned inputs (in red) are noticeably different from that
of the clean inputs (in blue), with the representations of
the poisoned inputs having much higher correlations. A
large fraction of poisoned inputs can thus be removed by
removing the inputs whose latent representations have the
highest correlations. However, the latent representations
yield a similar distribution of correlations for the
model with adversarial embedding, as shown in Figure
7b. The poisoned inputs in the dataset no longer exhibit
a larger correlation, and removing inputs with the highest
correlations is not sufficient to remove the majority of the
poisoned inputs from the training dataset, as poisoned and
clean samples are both removed at the same rate.
We now evaluate the dataset filtering defense based
on activation clustering, proposed by Chen et al. [7].
The defense consists of two main steps – clustering, and
performing additional detection steps on the resultant clus-
ters. We notice that the detection methods assume a clean
split between the poisoned samples and the clean sam-
ples. For example, the exclusionary reclassification step
assumes that the newly trained model does not contain
the backdoor behavior, and classifies the poisoned samples
as their true class. Thus, we compute the quality of the
clustering step using the adjusted Rand index to evaluate
the quality of the clustering. The perfect separation of
poisoned and clean samples will give a score of 1, whereas
random separation of the samples will give a score of 0.
We also retrain the model on the filtered dataset assuming
the best resultant cluster is selected for removal, i.e. the
resultant cluster with the highest fraction of poisoned
samples is removed. In the clustering step of the defense,
we perform independent component analysis to reduce
the latent representations to 10 independent components,
before running k-means clustering with k = 2.
Table 5 shows the adjusted Rand scores of the clusters
formed, as well as the attack success rate on the retrained
Model Dataset ε # Pois # Pois Left
(Baseline)
# Pois Left
(Adversarial Embedding)
Attack Success
(Baseline)
Attack Success
(Adversarial Embedding)
DenseNet C10 31 2241 37 (1.7%) 1406 (63.0%) 1.1% 97.3%
DenseNet GTSRB 46 1844 27 (1.5%) 1263 (68.5%) 0.0% 89.9%
VGG C10 31 2241 54 (2.4%) 1050 (46.9%) 1.5% 97.3%
VGG GTSRB 46 1844 11 (0.6%) 1004 (54.4%) 0.3% 90.3%
TABLE 4: Number of poisoned samples left in the dataset, as well as the attack success rate on the retrained models
for the dataset filtering defense based on spectral signatures [25]. The defense removes most poisoned samples from
the baseline model, but fails to do so for the model with adversarial embedding.
Model Dataset Rand Index
(Baseline)
Rand Index
(Adversarial Embedding)
Attack Success
(Baseline)
Attack Success
(Adversarial Embedding)
DenseNet CIFAR-10 0.979 0.182 1.7% 76.4%
DenseNet GTSRB 0.997 0.271 0.0% 91.4%
VGG CIFAR-10 0.998 6.31×10−4 1.9% 96.2%
VGG GTSRB 0.997 0.642 1.1% 74.3%
TABLE 5: Adjusted Rand indexes of the clusters formed from k-means clustering with k = 2 in the defense based on
activation clustering [7], as well as the attack success rate on the models retrained on the filtered dataset. A Rand index
close to 1 represents a good separation of clean and poisoned inputs in the clustering step, while a Rand index close to
0 represents poisoned inputs are present in both sets. Adversarial embedding is able to significantly reduce the quality
of clustering, and thus the retrained model still contains the backdoor behavior.
model for both the baseline, and the model with adver-
sarial embedding. The defense works well on the baseline
model, attaining almost perfect clustering of the clean and
poisoned samples (adjusted Rand index > 0.95), and the
attack success rate on the retrained models is very low
(0% to 1.9%). However, our attack successfully bypasses
this defense technique, yielding a lower resultant adjusted
Rand index after the clustering step. This signifies that a
large number of poisoned samples is present in both re-
sultant clusters. Thus, the model retrained on the resultant
filtered dataset still contains the backdoor behavior, and
exhibits a high attack success rate of above 75%.
To understand why our attack evades the defense,
we analyze the latent representations of the VGG model
trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Figure 8a shows the
latent representations of all inputs by the baseline model,
projected onto the top two independent components. The
poisoned inputs (in red) form a noticeably disjoint cluster
from the clean inputs (in blue). Thus, k-means clustering
can separate the poisoned inputs from the clean inputs
well, and most of the poisoned samples can be removed
from the training dataset by excluding the right cluster.
Figure 8b shows the latent representations for the model
with adversarial embedding, similarly projected onto the
top two independent components. The adversarial train-
ing causes the poisoned and clean latent representa-
tions to overlap significantly due to a convergence in
their distributions, so k-means clustering is unable to
separate the poison inputs from the clean inputs well.
Thus, removing either of the resultant k-means clusters
still leaves a significant number of poisoned sample in the
training dataset, and the retrained model will still contain
the backdoor.
5. Related Work
Backdoors in deep learning networks is a topic of
growing interest. Many studies explore backdoor injection
through data poisoning, where the attacker injects mali-
ciously crafted input and label samples into the training
dataset [11], [8], [19]. These poisoned inputs are typi-
cally images with the backdoor trigger superimposed, and
the target label altered. It has been shown that a small
number of poisoned data points (50 samples) is needed
to introduce a backdoor with a high attack success rate
(above 90%) [8]. It has been shown that the introduced
backdoors persist after the model is repurposed [11].
Thus, malicious behavior injected in models up the supply
chain can propagate to downstream models, even if the
retraining is done with a clean dataset. Many approaches
to data poisoning lead to a visible trigger superimposed
on the poisoned images, which makes malicious training
data apparent to human eyes, but it has been shown to
be possible to generate poison data that looks clean with
unaltered labels [19].
Backdoor attacks that do not rely on the attacker hav-
ing access to the training data have also been devised. In
the federated learning setting, the attacker has the ability
to broadcast weight updates to the other parties. This
ability can be exploited to broadcast weight updates that
introduce backdoor behavior to the models that receive
the update [2]. Federated learning settings with secure
aggregation are especially susceptible to this attack as the
individual weight updates cannot be inspected. Further-
more, the algorithm that generates the weight updates can
also take into account the anomaly detection technique,
in order to bypass the defense when secure aggregation is
not used. Various studies have also worked on making
distributed learning settings that converge to a useful
model despite the presence of Byzantine workers [27],
[29], [4]. The guarantees that these robust algorithms
provide, however, are shown to be insufficient [17], [3].
In response to the backdoor attacks that have been
devised, there have been several papers that aim to remove
backdoor behavior, besides the ones mentioned in this
paper. Liu et al., 2018 [15] take a similar approach of
pruning neurons based on the latent representations of a
known clean set of inputs, operating under the assumption
that the backdoor neurons are dormant for clean inputs.
(a) Baseline model. The poisoned representations have a signifi-
cantly higher correlation than the clean representations, and thus
can be filtered by removing samples with the top correlations.
(b) Model with adversarial embedding. The poisoned and clean
representations have similar distributions of correlations, and
thus filtering the samples with top correlations removes an equal
portion of clean and poisoned samples.
Figure 7: Correlation of latent representations of all inputs
in the training dataset with the top eigenvector for the data
filtering defense based on spectral signatures [25]. The
representations of poisoned inputs are in red.
Since it is possible to train a model to be robust to this
pruning, Liu et al. recommend a combination of pruning
and fine-tuning of the model to remove the backdoor
behavior. Some backdoor mitigation techniques work on
the input space of the model instead of the latent space,
relying on either training a model to identify anomalous
inputs, or to remove anomalous features in inputs before
feeding to the model [16].
Besides backdoor attacks, there have been many stud-
ies on adversarial machine learning where the discontin-
uous input-output mappings of models are exploited to
generate adversarial examples [23], [10]. It has also been
shown to be possible to generate adversarial images by
perturbing the color space of the image, thus preserving
the smoothness of the image, in order to evade detection
methods that rely on the abrupt pixel changes found in
many adversarial image detection methods [12].
(a) Baseline model. The representations of poisoned inputs (in
red) form a distinct separate cluster from the clean inputs, and
thus are easily separated by k-means clustering.
(b) Model with adversarial embedding. The representations of
poisoned inputs (in red) have a similar distribution as those of
clean inputs, thus both clusters formed by k-means clustering
contain a significant number of poisoned samples.
Figure 8: Latent representations of all inputs in the training
dataset projected onto their top two independent com-
ponents for the data filtering defense using activation
clustering [7]. The poisoned inputs are depicted in red.
6. Conclusions
We have designed a novel backdoor embedding attack
that successfully bypasses several prior backdoor detection
algorithms. While backdoor detection using the learned
latent representations greatly reduces the dimensionality
and thus complexity of the defense techniques, we have
shown that a sophisticated attacker is easily able to hide
the signals of the backdoor images in the latent represen-
tation, rendering the defense algorithms ineffective.
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